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Abstract:
David Foster Wallace’s “E Unibus Pluram” is an 
account of the prevalence of destructive irony 
at the end of the twentieth century. Trying to 
break free from the solipsism brought about 
by postmodern relativism, Wallace embraced 
sincerity as the cornerstone of the zeitgeist 
of the new millennium. This article offers an 
analysis of two salient sources of influence 
that could be considered as inspiration for 
Wallace’s alternative to postmodern irony: 
American transcendentalism and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. 
It does so with the intention of furthering the 
understanding of the cultural significance 
of the work of the author for the generation 
of writers that followed in his wake, and to 
demonstrate how the recovery of Romantic 
ideals may be the key to map out the nature 
of the paradigm shift to post-postmodernism.
Keywords:
David Foster Wallace, postmodernism, post-
postmodernism, New Sincerity.
Resumen:
"E Unibus Pluram" de David Foster Wallace 
es un relato del predominio de la ironía 
destructiva a fines del siglo XX. Tratando 
de liberarse del solipsismo provocado por 
el relativismo posmoderno, Wallace abrazó 
la sinceridad como la piedra angular del 
zeitgeist del nuevo milenio. Este artículo 
ofrece un análisis de dos fuentes de influencia 
destacadas que podrían considerarse como 
inspiración para la alternativa de Wallace a 
la ironía posmoderna: el trascendentalismo 
estadounidense y las investigaciones 
filosóficas de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Se hace 
con la intención de promover la comprensión 
del significado cultural de la obra del autor 
para la generación de escritores que siguieron 
su estela, y demostrar cómo la recuperación 
de los ideales románticos puede ser la clave 
para trazar la naturaleza del cambio de 
paradigma hacia el posmodernismo.
Palabras clave:
David Foster Wallace, posmodernismo, 
posmodernismo, nueva sinceridad.
218
Revista Internacional de Culturas y Literaturas, diciembre 2020
ISSN: 1885-3625
























In order to understand the passing of postmodernism in American fiction, 
it is important to analyse the fundamental figure of David Foster Wallace. His 
influential work, especially his novel Infinite Jest (1996), is essential to understand the 
transformation that occurs in a large spectrum of the subsequent American literature. 
Wallace grew up in a postmodern America where “the ‘tyranny’ of irony was almost 
unsurpassable” (Timmer 2010: 101). To escape this tyranny, it would be necessary to 
recover an honesty that Wallace himself calls “Too sincere. Backward, quaint, naïve, 
anachronistic” (Wallace 1993: 193). For him, the writers to end the reign of irony would 
have to be candid rebels who adopt frankness as the fundamental principle of their 
ethos: “much of what he (almost unbelievingly) envisioned about the next rebels has, 
to a certain extent, really come about: the softness, a certain sentimentality, sincerity, 
and the backing away from ironic watching” (Timmer 2010: 101-102). It is a figure 
similar to the one that Jerry Saltz alludes to in “Sincerity and Irony Hug It Out” (2010). 
Saltz noted the new attitude of some artists, free from shame and fear: “I’m noticing 
a new approach to artmaking in recent museum and gallery shows . . . They grasp 
that they can be ironic and sincere at the same time, and they are making art from 
this compound-complex state of mind—what Emerson called ‘alienated majesty’” 
(Saltz 2010) The rejection of irony and the incorporation of honesty in an innocent and 
sentimental way are the basis of this New Sincerity movement.1 
One of the first authors to tread successfully the path opened by Wallace was Dave 
Eggers. He made use of the bravery advocated by Wallace. When speaking about the 
values that the new generation of rebels must have, Timmer points out that: “all these 
ingredients are clearly part of the aesthetic of Eggers’s work most obviously” (2010: 
102). In his novels, Eggers experiments with the connection between individuals started 
by Wallace in Infinite Jest. Eggers uses the word “lattice” to name that connection in 
his first novel, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (2000). The protagonist of that 
book, Dave, who is his alter ego, defines the concept of lattice in a passage of the book 
as a network of people who think the same way and who take care of each other:
The lattice that we are either part of or apart from. The lattice is the connective 
tissue. The lattice is everyone else, the lattice is my people, collective youth, people 
like me, hearts ripe, brains aglow. The lattice is everyone I have ever known, 
mostly those my age or thereabouts . . . I see us as a vast matrix, an army, a whole, 
each one of us responsible to one another, because no one else is. I mean, every 
person that walks through the door to help with Might becomes part of our lattice 
. . . all these people, the people who come to us or we come to, the subscribers, our 
friends, their friends, their friends (sic), who knows who knows who, a human 
ocean moving as one. (Eggers 2000: 184-185)
1  The term New Sincerity was coined by Adam Kelly in his article “David Foster Wallace and the 
New Sincerity in American Fiction” (2010). With it, he designated what he perceived to be the new 
drift of the fiction written by a young generation of writers that followed in the wake of Wallace at 
the turn of the millennium.
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He compares the concept to a snowshoe racket: it helps distribute the weight of the 
person wearing them and its lattice makes it not sink: “[y]ou wear snowshoes when 
the snow is deep and porous. The latticework within the snowshoe’s oval distributes 
the wearer’s weight over a wider area, in order to keep him or her falling through 
the snow. So people, the connections between people, the people you know, and that 
know you, and know your situation and your story and your troubles or whatnot” 
(Eggers 2000: 185). Feeling the lost connection again brings the literary work closer 
to the transcendental notion of unity that Emerson expressed in his essay “The Over-
Soul” (1841) with his famous symbolism of “part and particle.” 
The Supreme Critic on the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet 
of that which must be, is that great nature in which we rest as the earth lies in 
the soft arms of the atmosphere; that Unity, that Over-Soul, within which every 
man’s particular being is contained and made one with all other; . . . We live in 
succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of 
the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle 
is equally related; the eternal ONE. (Emerson [1841] 2000: 237)
It is also linked to the famous notion of the self as pertaining to the universe in its 
entirety, declared by Walt Whitman at the beginning of “Song of Myself” (1855), which 
substitutes the word particle for atom: 
I celebrate myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume,
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. ([1855] 1998: 1-3)
We are going to use Eggers’s idea of lattice to see how it relates to the Romantic 
idea of “spirit,” which is the seed of the concept of nationalism as we know it today. 
By doing this, we hope to shed some light on the place Wallace occupies in the post-
postmodern paradigm. This notion of “spirit” perfectly describes the moment and 
the direction of the turn in the intended paradigm shift of the twenty-first century, 
since the idea originated from a fanatical xenophobia that occurred in the German 
territories in the early nineteenth century. In that context, this hate, especially towards 
the French—which was explicable due to the hegemony of the Napoleonic armies in 
the territory after the victories in Austria and Prussia—, was caused by the risk of 
losing the identity. Isaiah Berlin points out that Johann Gottlieb Fichte highlighted the 
importance of  a kind of transcendental self, derived from Kantian philosophy. Against 
this, he opposes an empirical self of which we are aware when the world affects us:
When you asked yourself what reason you had for supposing that the World 
existed, what reason you had . . . what reason you had for supposing that solipsism 
was not true, and that everything was not a figment of your imagination . . . the 
answer was that you could not doubt that some kind of clash or collision occurred 
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between you and what you wanted, between you and what you wished to be, 
between you and the stuff upon which you wished to impose your personality and 
which, pro tanto, resisted. (Berlin [1999] 2013: 108-109)
According to Fichte, one cannot exist without the other. The world, as science 
describes it, “is an artificial construction in relation to this absolutely primary, 
irreducible, fundamental datum, not even of experience, but of being” (Berlin [1999] 
2013: 109). In Romanticism, then, this implies that the only thing that has authentic 
relevance is that idea of self.  This has political implications, since, if that idea of  self 
is identified with that of a community, a certain religion, a class or a State pursuing a 
collective will, the individual is reduced to a constituent part “of a much bigger, much 
more impressive, much more historically persistent personality” (Berlin [1999] 2013: 
109). 
If we apply all the previously mentioned to Eggers’s concept of lattice, being part 
of this network makes the individuals be part of something larger than themselves. 
Thus, solipsism is neutralized. Being an ingredient of a greater will, expressed in a 
grand narrative, brings affiliated members into contact. By losing that superstructure, 
the individual loses the will that gives meaning to the march. Although, according to 
Hegel, the behaviour of this march, related to the Romantic concept of “zeitgeist”—
and even to the paradigm, somewhat tangentially—, is revealed by representative 
people who are a simple instrument necessary to satisfy the purpose of the Geist, of 
the spirit. Allen W. Wood explains it in Hegel’s Ethical Thought (1990): “[f]or Hegel the 
course of history is set by the needs of spirit and the growth of its self-knowledge. 
The individuals who facilitate the satisfaction of these needs are simply the necessary 
instruments of spirit’s purpose” (1995: 279).
Berlin draws our attention to the figure of the Scottish idealist Thomas Carlyle, for 
whom the hero—figure that likens Hegel’s concept of representative man—was the 
engine of the story. Through his “great man theory,” developed in his collection of 
lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History (1841), Carlyle explained 
that it was thanks to these men with superior innate qualities—wisdom, courage, 
intelligence—that history advanced. For Carlyle, these men were associated with the 
figure of the Romantic hero. 
Emerson published his collection of essays Representative Men: Seven Lectures 
in 1850, nine years after the publication of Carlyle’s On Heroes. Emerson’s work 
developed an idea very similar to that of Carlyle. However, there was an essential 
difference. Emerson’s theory was democratic and egalitarian. This harmonizes with 
the ideology on which the new American nation was based, that is, the natural law: 
all men are created equal. In that new country, nature was the primeval source from 
which everything else emanated. The possibilities that the nature of America offered 
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to the enlightened human being were limitless. The same document that legitimized 
the United States as an independent country and not subject to others, the Declaration 
of Independence (1776), the foundation of the other great legitimating document, the 
Constitution of the United States of America (1787), was based on those ideas. This can 
be seen in the very first paragraph of the document:
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to 
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to 
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions 
of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the 
separation. (Declaration of Independence)
The text that gives legitimacy to the independence from Great Britain does so by 
using as its foundation stone an idea that comes from the same nation from which they 
separated. This ideological dependence, which was brewing since the beginning of the 
history of the United States, would have great importance in the development of the 
culture of the country. The new nation would carry that burden for a long time, and 
the fight to get rid of it would become one of its most outstanding hallmarks. Emerson, 
who also desired a true American personality independent from the old continent, 
made nature the central theme of all his work and, by using natural law in his thinking, 
he laid the foundations for one of the most important notions in American culture. 
For Emerson, representative men were not special Romantic heroes, born with special 
characteristics, in view of the fact that all men were created equal. However, these 
men were special because they observed nature in a special way that allowed them 
to extract those singular characteristics from it. That is, every man carried a potential 
hero within himself, which contrasted with the hero of Carlyle—and Hegel—, who 
was born predestined. America distanced itself from the inheritance of Great Britain 
and began to develop its own personality.
In Eggers’s foreword to Infinite Jest’s tenth anniversary edition (2006), after tirelessly 
repeating that the book is a truly brilliant literary feat, difficult to read and virtually 
impossible to write, he describes Wallace as a normal person who is capable to do 
something extraordinary:
He is from the Midwest—east-central Illinois, to be specific, which is an intensely 
normal part of the country (not far, in fact, from a city, no joke, named Normal). 
So he is normal, and regular, and ordinary, and this is his extraordinary, and 
irregular, and not-normal achievement, a thing that will outlast him and you and 
me, but will help future people understand us—how we felt, how we lived, what 
we gave to each other and why. (2006: xvi)
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This is how Eggers’s lattice is related to transcendentalism through Romantic 
philosophy, and it is for all of the above that he emphasizes that Wallace is a normal 
person: because he is one of those representative American democratic Emersonian 
people.
Like the democratic Whitman, Wallace is just like everyone else—and Eggers is 
too. One could even say that there is a kind of correspondence between the figures 
of Wallace and Emerson, and Eggers and Thoreau. If Emerson was the proponent of 
all transcendental thinking, and Thoreau the one who carried it out in his life, in the 
same way, Wallace shaped a new sincerity and the idea of the candid rebel, and Eggers 
puts it into practice not only through his literary work, but also—in a Thoreauvian 
manner—through his philanthropic projects.2
Paul Giles affirms that Wallace “emerges out of an intellectual heritage invested in 
quite traditional Americanist values, as adumbrated by Foerster: Transcendentalism, 
community spirit, self-reliance, and so on” (2012: 4). He indicates that “[t]he ethical 
impulses that help to drive Wallace’s narrative are themselves indebted to American 
intellectual traditions of Transcendentalism and Pragmatism” (2012: 19). Giles 
highlights the shared points he had with Emerson and Thoreau: “he also has in 
common with Emerson and Thoreau an ambivalence toward the ontological reality of 
other people” (2012: 9). Zuzanna Ladyga notes that the figure of the walking imago of 
“E Unibus Pluram” “comes from no other than Ralph Waldo Emerson and his essay 
‘Manners’” (2011: 240). Curiously, when Timmer develops in her influential book the 
question of identity in the author’s works analysing three of his texts, at no time does 
she speak about transcendentalism, even though she applies many of the principles of 
Emersonian thought to her study. 
On the other hand, Timmer exposes the conflict between the cultural phase of the end 
of the century and the construction of identity that is evident in the friction resulting 
from applying an excess of feelings to postmodern narrative practices. The point is 
that, although postmodern conventions are not suited to the formation of an identity, 
escaping these is not easy, since “one feels ‘locked’ in postmodern narrative practices 
that are supposedly open, in-coherent, and allow, even urge, deviations from narrative 
conventions. Simply put: when deviation from the norm becomes the norm, then what 
do you do?” (Timmer 2010: 103). Timmer tells us that the narrator of “Westward the 
Course of Empire Takes Its Way” uses his own postmodern metafictional techniques to 
2  In addition to fighting for the rights of teachers and promoting education in the US, Eggers 
sponsors, among others, the following charitable causes: 826 National, which promotes literacy and 
creative writing; Alliance For The Lost Boys Of Sudan, which provides medical and educational 
services to the orphaned children of the Second Sudanese Civil War; Valentino Achak Deng 
Foundation, which works by creating development projects for communities in the Republic of 
South Sudan.
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criticize that same narrative style (2010: 104), and it is, certainly, easy to see if we read 
the following passage from the book:
[i]f this were a piece of metafiction, which it’s NOT, the exact number of typeset 
lines between this reference and the prenominate referent would very probably 
be mentioned, which would be a princely pain in the ass, not to mention cocky 
. . . but in metafiction it would, nay needs be mentioned, a required postmodern 
convention aimed at drawing the poor old reader’s emotional attention to the fact 
that the narrative bought and paid for . . . is not in fact a barely-there window onto 
a different and truly diverting world, but rather in fact an ‘artifact,’ an object . . . 
composed of . . . conventions, and is thus in a ‘deep’ sense just an opaque forgery 
of a transfiguring window, not a real window, a gag, and thus in a deep (but 
intentional, now) sense artificial, which is to say fabricated, false, a fiction . . . this 
self-conscious explicitness and deconstructed disclosure supposedly making said 
metafiction ‘realer’ than a piece of pre-postmodern ‘Realism’ that depends on 
certain antiquated techniques. (qtd. in Timmer 2010: 103-104)
In “Westward,” one of the characters, Mark, wonders if postmodern narrative games 
are “just ‘fun’ for fun’s sake, and devoid of any humanness?” (Timmer 2010: 106). 
Mark tries to write a story with a great human component and, therefore, he wants 
to separate himself from metafiction, because postmodern games lead to solipsism. 
Timmer draws attention to the fact that, in Wallace’s story, it is precisely that feeling 
of solipsism what holds us together. In this way, Wallace transcends metafiction to 
re-humanize the subject. For this, he proposes “[t]he use of metafictional narrative 
conventions as misdirected vehicle, as a ‘possibility of transport’ . . . that could perhaps 
convey something more ‘true’: a ‘pathetically unself-conscious sentimentality’” (Wallace 
2012: 108; emphasis in original). 
The task of regaining realism seems futile in an era in which the writer’s identity 
is fragmented. Although there is a desire for sincerity, for humanism, for reality, 
relativism does not allow reaching the desired transcendence. Raoul Eshelman explains 
it as follows:
The main difference vis-à-vis postmodernism asserts itself in this case in the use of 
a holistic, discrete subject and sign. This is logically and practically incompatible 
with postmodernism’s notion of subject and sign as unstable side effects of a 
constantly shifting textual context. At present, however, the use of classical devices 
of postmodernism to create closed signs and subjects is almost unavoidable: the 
new epoch is still dependent on the instruments of the old. 
It seems impossible to achieve an identity associated with an idea of truth in a 
postmodern world. Wallace finds it is possible through an honesty free of postmodern 
irony. He tries to recover sincerity and single entendre, and balance this with the 
counterpoint of irony in the pre-modernist—in this case, Romantic—sense of the word.
224
Revista Internacional de Culturas y Literaturas, diciembre 2020
ISSN: 1885-3625
























When Wallace faces the impossibility of escaping postmodernity, Tom Wolfe’s 
explanation, expressed in his seminal manifesto “Stalking the Billion-footed Beast” 
(1989) comes to mind: reality itself does not allow us to write realistic narrative in the 
way that Balzac or Zola did. Doing so is impossible because reality itself is fragmented. 
Therefore, realism cannot be achieved through the recovery of realism in such a 
way (Wolfe 1989: 46). After recounting a real event that surpasses any fragmented 
postmodern fiction, Wolfe says:
By the mid-1960s the conviction was not merely that the realistic novel was no 
longer possible but that American life itself no longer deserved the term real. 
American life was chaotic, fragmented, random, discontinuous; in a word, absurd. 
Writers in the university creative writing programs had long, phenomenological 
discussions in which they decided that the act of writing words on a page was the 
real thing and the so-called real world of America was the fiction, requiring the 
suspension of disbelief. The so-called real world became a favorite phrase. (1989: 
49)
In this atmosphere, Wallace’s characters seek to end their solipsism by searching for 
a transcendent connection between them. This brings him even closer to Whitman’s 
democratic poetry, Thoreau’s intuitive action, and Emerson’s idealistic philosophy in 
which individuals are united through nature. In order to transcend language games, 
Wallace suggests trying to understand through silent intuition, without words. 
Starting from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wallace is suggesting a 180-degree turn in the 
perception of reality. For Wittgenstein what cannot be said cannot be known—and 
it is better not to speak about it, since it does not lead to any certainty—. Conversely, 
Wallace suggests that what can be said leads to confusion and, finally to not knowing 
anything, or not being sure, even of existence. Therefore, the ideal would be to know 
through silent perception. This brings him closer to transcendental philosophy. In 
“Self-Reliance” (1841), Emerson states: “[a]nd now at last the highest truth on this 
subject remains unsaid; probably cannot be said; for all that we say is the far-off 
remembering of the intuition” ([1841] 1998: 1135). Intuition is the purest way to get 
to the truth; language would be a distortion of it. In “The Over-soul,” Emerson talks 
about silence and language, and how everything is related in a superior structure to 
which absolutely all nature belongs: “the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which 
every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE” ([1841] 2000: 237). Only 
through direct observation, not mediated by language, can that knowledge be reached, 
which is innate in all individuals and refers. Emerson points to something similar to 
Wittgenstein’s language games: “[o]nly by the vision of that Wisdom can the horoscope 
of the ages be read, and by falling back on our better thoughts, by yielding to the spirit 
of prophecy which is innate in every man, we can know what it saith: Every man’s 
words who speaks from that life must sound vain to those who do not dwell in the 
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same thought on their own part” ([1841] 2000: 237). Consequently, by getting rid of 
language, we get rid of its games and, this way, we get rid of the incommensurability 
of postmodern truths. The action, carried out by means of intuition—since the truth 
is something innate—is the basis of knowledge. Hence, the last words of “Westward” 
are “[l]isten to the silence behind the engine’s noise. Jesus, Sweets, listen. Hear it? It’s 
a love song. For whom? You are loved” (2012: 373; emphasis in original). In relation to 
this, according to what Emerson says in Nature (1836), “[w]ords are finite organs of the 
infinite mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what is in truth. They break, chop, 
and impoverish it. An action is the perfection and publication of thought. A right action 
seems to fill the eye, and to be related to all nature” ([1836] 1998: 1088). Nonetheless, 
even though the above would be ideal, the world in which Wallace lives does not 
allow him to put into practice that form of intuitive knowledge. The solution to this 
problem is, once more, transcendentalism: “[t]he way to approach truth is to practice 
what Emerson calls sincerity” (Kateb 2002: 105). Thus, when speaking of Wallace’s 
short story “Octet,” Timmer draws attention to the last part of the story in which the 
narrator realizes that he cannot escape metafiction. However, what he can do is be “not 
just sincere but almost naked. Worse than naked—more like unarmed” (Wallace 2009: 
131), he can make use of a “completely naked helpless pathetic sincerity” (2009: 131). 
This total sincerity, expressed through the symbolism of nudity is the beginning of a 
new sensibility related to transcendentalism. For Emerson, the way to find truth is also 
sincerity. He saw, for example, Thoreau as the personification of it—“Thoreau was 
sincerity itself . . . A truth-speaker he, capable of the most deep and strict conversation” 
(Emerson [1862] 2000: 823). That same quality is one of the characteristics that also 
defines Whitman’s poetry.
According to Adam Kelly, “David Foster Wallace affirmed and embodied sincerity 
as a crucial value in his life and work, perhaps even as that work’s defining feature” 
(2010: 131). Kelly explains how Wallace not only drew attention to the pernicious abuse 
of irony; he also laid the foundations for a new sensibility in fiction. The experiments 
of modernism, he contends, had shifted the focus from sincerity to authenticity by 
changing attitudes regarding the essence of authors and their way of conceiving 
creative agency. Commenting on Lionel Trilling’s book Sincerity and Authenticity, Kelly 
affirms:
the modernist idea of the artist as aloof genius, as persona rather than person, 
shattered the older, traditional view, perhaps best articulated in Wordsworth’s 
understanding of poets as “men speaking to men.” Citing various formulations, 
by Eliot, Joyce and Gide, Trilling suggests that the modernists aesthetic of 
impersonality means that “the criterion of sincerity, the calculation of the degree 
of congruence between feeling and avowal, is not pertinent to the judgement of 
their work.” (2010: 132)
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It follows that sincerity gives way to an authenticity stripped of “any demonstrable 
awareness of a public self” (2010: 133), which paves the way for the society of irony. 
Wallace “characterized his artistic project as a response to the contemporary prevalence 
of irony in American literature and culture” (2010: 133). The intellectualization of 
fundamental values in postmodernism  collides with the profoundly committed 
representation of them in the previous era: “As a contrast to the modernist concern 
with authentic forms of representation, Dostoevsky is explicitly presented by Wallace 
as an ideological writer who possesses the required ‘degrees of passion, conviction, 
and engagement with deep moral issues that we—here, today—cannot or do not 
permit ourselves’” (Kelly 2010: 134). 
Kelly agrees with Timmer when interpreting Wallace’s position regarding the 
recovery of that sincerity: one cannot return to pre-ironic sensibility for the simple 
reason that the society of that time and its values  are very different from those of the 
society of the era of television described in “E Unibus Pluram.” Like Timmer, Kelly 
draws attention to Wallace’s need to apprise that recovery with postmodern fiction. 
Being self-consciousness one of the most important characteristics of postmodern 
fiction, the authors were more concerned with creating something that may sound 
sincere than with what really is:
If, according to Wallace, a writer must anticipate how his work will be received 
by readers in a complex culture, and thus about communicating what sounds 
true, rather than simply what is true, is he really being fully sincere? Is this ‘a 
congruence of avowal and actual feeling,’ or even an endorsement of ‘single-
entendre principles?’ Is there not a schizophrenic and/or manipulative quality at 
work here that counteracts the good intentions of the artist as communicator of 
truth? (Kelly 2010: 135)
Wallace’s solution for this conundrum was a new reading of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. He was very knowledgeable about the works of the Austrian thinker, 
who gave him the basis for language-bound solipsism, which is so characteristic of his 
fiction. However, as he exposes in his interview with Larry McCaffery, Wittgenstein, 
in the second stage of his philosophy ends solipsism by declaring that language only 
exists as a relationship between individuals. He summarizes in a sentence the process 
the philosopher goes through from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to Philosophical 
Investigations: “The loss of the whole external world” (McCaffery 2012: 44). In his first 
work, Wittgenstein talks about the referentiality of language in its relationship with 
reality, which separates us from the outside world. The problem with this first system is 
that it leads to solipsism. However, in Philosophical Investigations, Wallace points out in 
the same interview, Wittgenstein changes his attitude towards language and develops 
a very different system: “Wittgenstein argues that for language even to be possible, 
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it must always be a function of relationships between persons” (2012: 44). This ends 
solipsism, since this theory “makes language dependent on human community” (2012: 
44).
His revered philosopher is the source of one of his greatest concerns: solipsism 
and relativism. When Wittgenstein ends the first of the problems in Philosophical 
Investigations, he gives rise to the second by creating the system of language games. 
There is no total system on which to rely in order to transcend. For this reason, the 
individual can only think that there are others who are in the same solipsistic situation, 
given that there is no way to establish an effective and superior causal relationship 
between reality and one of the language games in particular. Timmer refers to this 
when she analyses the character of Mark in Wallace’s “Westward”: 
Mark’s ‘central delusion and contemporary flaw’, we learn, is that he thinks ‘he’s 
the only person in the World who feels like the only person in the World. It’s a 
solipsistic delusion’. He is afraid of being ‘Alone. Trapped. Kept from yourself’. 
The great ‘horror’ is this aloneness (as it is in Infinite Jest) . . . What Mark does not 
know is, simply, ‘that other boys know this too’, that this feeling of horror is not 
at all a unique feeling — that it is, furthermore this ‘solipsism [which] binds us 
together’ . . . paradoxically. (2010: 107)
Reality is fragmented and the individuals are locked inside themselves again. The 
only way to overcome this dilemma, from Wallace’s point of view, was to expose 
the limitations of language by developing and perfecting it. An absolute command 
of language does not ensure an absolute command of reality. To demonstrate this, 
he immolated himself—as Dave Eggers does at the end of A Heartbreaking Work of 
Staggering Genius—3as a modern Romantic hero and as a post-postmodern Emersonian 
representative person.
By developing a perfect use of language, Wallace exposed language’s shortcomings. 
The excess of language made obvious the need for silence to reconnect. It is a matter 
of faith to try to understand reality without a mediating language. Kelly establishes a 
common thread between Wallace’s involvement, through the philosophy of language, 
with sincerity and irony, and his debt to Stanley Cavell, through whom Wallace reaches 
Emerson:
Through Cavell, Wallace also engaged with Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous essay 
“Self-Reliance,” and this engagement led to two Wallace short stories inspired by 
Emerson’s idea of sincerity as “good posture.” Reading these stories, I show how 
3  At the end of his debut novel, Dave Eggers makes a kind of metaphorical ritual sacrifice; a 
messianic pseudo-Eucharist: “What the fuck does it take to show you motherfuckers, what does it 
fucking take what do you want how much do you want because I am willing and I’ll stand before 
you and I’ll raise my arms and give you my chest and throat and wait, and I’ve been so old for so 
long, for you, for you, I want it fast and right through me—Oh do it, do it motherfuckers, do it do it 
you fuckers finally, finally, finally.”
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Cavell’s positing of a specifically American way of handling language, filtered 
through Emerson, helped Wallace to address problems that dogged him and 
fascinated him for his entire career. (Kelly 2015: no page number)
Kelly argues that Wallace points to a dialogue between the reader and the author 
himself in which he hopes to end the solipsism:4
In a pithy formulation, Steven Connor has quipped that “[b]eing modernist always 
meant not quite realizing that you were so,” whereas “[b]eing postmodernist 
always involved the awareness that you were so.” Within these terms, I would 
suggest, being a “post-postmodernist” of Wallace’s generation means never quite 
being sure whether you are one, whether you have really managed to escape 
narcissism, solipsism, irony and insincerity. (2010: 145)
Numerous authors pay attention to the relationship between the events of 9/11 
and the change of attitude in the world of literature. Peter Boxall, for example, 
indicates the profusion of works whose plot revolves around the attack in post-event 
literature “which has become known as the ‘9/11 novel’” (2013: 126),5 and of novels 
that somehow touch the subject. A little later in the same book, Boxall mentions the 
article by Kelly that we have been using and he relates it to the attacks. He connects 
the feeling of seriousness and new sincerity with the crisis of the new millennium 
and with the need to change the referentiality of the novel from self-awareness to the 
committed description of reality. Although it is true that older postmodern authors 
like Paul Auster, Thomas Pynchon or T. C. Boyle wrote through the crisis into post-
postmodernity, they continued to use postmodern resources, even when a change in 
reality was perceived. The new generation of authors that followed in Wallace’s steps, 
on the other hand, changed their sensibility towards the reality of the crisis.
Wittegensteinian philosophy and transcendentalism were always at the heart of 
Wallace’s writing and the reconciliation of these two ways of conceiving reality worked 
in balance in his work to, on the one hand, expose the problems presented by a reality 
described from a purely linguistic point of view—and associated with the relativity of 
language games—and, on the other hand, giving solutions to these problems through 
4  “In the work of younger writers whom Wallace has influenced, these dialogic concerns abound. 
For instance, Joshua Ferris’s novel Then We Came to the End only breaks with its first-person plural 
narrative ‘we’ in its revelatory final two lines—‘We were the only two left. Just the two of us, you and 
me’ . . . This direct acknowledgement of reader by writer, and vice versa, is captured by the final line 
of Dave Eggers’s What is the What: ‘All the while I will know that you are there. How can I pretend 
that you do not exist? It would be almost as impossible as you pretending that I do not exist.’” (Kelly 
2010: 145-146)
5  Boxall mentions these titles: “Claire Messud’s The Emperor’s Children, Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, Joseph O’Neill’s Netherland, Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, Kate Jennings’ Moral Hazard, Don DeLillo’s Falling Man, Ian McEwan’s Saturday, 
Colum McCann’s Let the Great World Spin, Frédéric Beigbeder’s Windows on the World, Amy Waldman’s 
The Submission and Kamila Shamsie’s Burnt Shadows, among many others” (2013: 126).
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an understanding of reality far from the logic of language and close to an Emersonian 
intuitive action. That does not mean that Wallace solved the problems of solipsism 
and existentialism of the late 20th century, but he certainly did identify its origin in 
his essay “E Unibus Pluram,” an oppressive and institutionalized postmodern irony. 
This irony, omnipresent in the media at the end of the 20th century, was capable of 
destroying hypocrisy and creating hope, but it was unable to build anything in its 
place, thus leaving an existential void. His proposed solution to the problem, a writing 
of total honesty, would be the foundation stone of the New Sincerity movement.
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